We present a theory of product design covering a large class of investors. Bayesian laws of information processing provide the logical foundation and lead to a simple structuring tool -the payoff elasticity equation. Structuring of investment derivatives is summarized as a manufacturing process.
Introduction
In [1] we reviewed the shortcomings of the pre-crisis approach to product design, advocated the need for a better, more quantitative, approach and proposed some practical solutions.
So far, most of our examples have been centered around the important special case of the growth-optimizing investor. This is an investor which defines growth in terms of compounded rate of returns (logarithmic rate of return) and seeks to maximize the expectation of this rate regardless of the risks. First introduced by Bernoulli in 1738, this is probably the oldest and one of the best researched benchmarks of investment behavior [2, 3] .
With the growth-optimizing (very risky) investor on the one hand and the risk-free (bond) investor on the other hand, we got some feel for the range of products which most sensible investors would want to use [4] . In this paper we refine our framework empowering individual investors to control their risk appetite in a more precise way.
Deriving derivatives
Let x be a random variable with some financial significance -this can be anything from a stock price or an average commodity value to temperature readings in Texas. The variable x can be a vector, containing several such examples as components. Vector-valued x can also be used to hold time series of a market variable (see [1] for a concrete example). Financial product is called a derivative of x if its payoff F is defined as a function of x.
Structuring of F must depend on clients' needs and views as well as market information. Not just any ad-hoc dependence is good though. Not even when it is clear and welldefined. Superstitions and compulsive disorders often manifest themselves as transparent, well-defined procedures which lead people to disastrous payoffs. The answer to problems of this type is science. In the case of financial derivatives it begins with making sure that structuring is guided by the logical laws of information processing.
Investor equivalence principle
We focus our presentation around the simplest case of real-valued underlying, x ∈ R. This assumption is not crucial in any way and we use it purely for notational clarity. Following [4] , we partition the range of possible values of x into non-overlapping intervals using a discrete mesh (. . . , x i , x i+1 , . . . ). Imagine now a set of securities {s i }, where each s i pays 1 when x fixes between x i and x i+1 and zero otherwise. We can get a quote for purchasing the securities, p i = quoted price(s i ). It is tempting to call {s i } the ArrowDebreu securities and connect (undiscounted) {p i } to the risk-neutral probabilities for x. It is important to resist this temptation. This would introduce a lot of unnecessary assumptions and would make our theory considerably less useful. At this point we do not require a two-way liquid arbitrage-free market of securities for each distinct state of the economy. All we need is someone who would be willing to sell {s i } -a set which may contain just a couple of securities.
In [4] we introduced {s i } as binary spreads and argued that for a very large class of investors the problem of optimal investment is equivalent to optimal splitting of capital across the {s i }. Let {β i } be the proportions in which the investor decides to partition their capital ( i β i = 1). Only one security among {s i } can mature in the money, so for the payoff, F , from the investment we compute
where k is the index of the security that matures in the money and r k = 1/p k is the quoted return on that security. We define the market-implied distribution by normalizing the prices m k = p k / i p i and rewrite the above equation in the "Bayesian" form
where we decided not to burden our notation with trivial normalization constants (this can be arranged formally by re-defining F k ).
Equation (2) covers all investment scenarios which can be broken down into mutually exclusive events {s i }. Given that the choice of the underlying variable remains completely up to the investor this is a very general setting. Indeed, not only can we use x to mean anything we want (from exotic strategies to weather readings), the choice of β k in (1) is also very general -so far we didn't even assume the investor to be rational in any way. Equation (2) is just basic accounting. In the following we use Eq. (2) as a property which defines any investor .
Let {b k } be investor-believed probabilities that the corresponding securities {s k } mature in the money. In [4] we considered a special case of a growth-optimizing investor. In this special case the fractions {β k } coincide with {b k } [5] . Equation (2) becomes
where f k denotes the growth-optimal payoff. We revisit this case in more detail later.
Although growth-optimizing investors form a very specific group, we see that focusing on this group does not at all reduce the range of possible investment decisions. Indeed, both {β i } and {b i } must add up to one, but with no further constraints, Eqs. (2) and (3) are solved by the same set of payoffs, {f } = {F }. By pairing up these payoffs we can now make an even more detailed observation, which, in view of its generality, we formulate here as a principle:
Any investor can be viewed as growth-optimizing.
More precisely, general investor chooses the same product, F = f , i.e. behaves in the same way, as some growth-optimizing investor whose beliefs {b k } happen to coincide with {β k }.
The principle focuses our attention on the actual actions of the investor -his net economic behavior. We need someone to watch the logical integrity of these actions as they are being structured. The principle suggests having a look through the eyes of a growth-optimizing investor -a very convenient choice.
Logical investors
In [4] we made a connection between Eq. (3) and Bayes' theorem. We recognized the market-implied {m k } and the investor-believed {b k } as the prior and the posterior distributions and highlighted the fundamental connection between optimal payoff structures and the likelihood functions. This gave us some understanding of how growth-optimizing investors learn and then express the acquired knowledge through trading. In the previous section we also discovered that, in terms of their net economic behavior, growth-optimizing investors are surprisingly versatile. It looks like they can be educated to act as if they had sophisticated risk preferences. The aim of this section is to describe and understand this education process mathematically. To this end we narrow the scope of our investigations and focus on the case of rational investors.
It can be shown that rational investors behave as if they were maximizing the expected value of utility [6] . The expected utility approach which follows from this observation is well known in economic theory. We will use it here as well. It is important, however, to emphasize that by adopting the expected utility approach we do not reduce the generality of our arguments in the same way as it happens in economic theories. For us, rationality is not an assumption. It is part of the goal. We understand that being rational is not easy. So we build tools.
Consider a rational investor with utility u() and a view on x given by the probabilities {b i }, where each b i measures the degree of investor's belief for x to end up between x i and x i+1 . Because logarithm is a monotonically increasing function, we can, without further loss of generality, write the utility as a function of the logarithmic rate of return. We also allow the utility to depend on x explicitly. The problem of optimal investment is solved by maximizing the expectation
over all possible proportions {β i } subject to the budget constraint i β i = 1. The Lagrangian for this optimization reads
By setting ∂L/∂β k = 0 we compute
where prime denotes derivative with respect to the first argument. This implies
Substituting this back into Eq. (6) we obtain
This equation makes sense only for positive β k . This is indeed guaranteed by the monotonicity of the utility function with respect to return u ′ > 0 (the limiting case of zero β k is trivial and can be removed from the optimization problem (5)). Solving this equation for β k gives us the optimal investment strategy. This includes the growth-optimizing investor as a special case. Indeed, in this case u ′ = 1, Eq. (8) reduces to the Kelly equation, β k = b k , which in view of (2), leads to our basic equation (3) .
Research in economics and finance is often done in the comfort of fully continuous settings where the tools of calculus are more readily available. Although our approach does not need that, it would be easier for us to see the emergence of classical concepts if we present our main arguments in a similar fashion. So, substituting Eq. (1) into (8) and writing the result in a fully continuous notation we get
We are now in a position to understand the logic of how our investor learns and how this learning process translates into investment decisions.
The investor needs to learn two kinds of information. On the one hand, he needs to learn about the market. On the other hand he needs to learn about himself (his preferences and goals). It is a fundamental property of Bayesian learning that, given a set of data, it does not matter in which order the various parts of this data are included in the calculation [7] . Indeed, conditional probabilities P (x|A, B) = P (x|B, A). So we have a lot of freedom how to organize our calculations.
Great, but how do we start? This question is infamous in statistics as the problem of choosing the prior. In general, choosing the prior can be very hard and the end solution is often ad-hoc. We are lucky, however, to have a natural starting point. This is a growthoptimizing investor who chooses m(x) as the prior information on the market. Why growth-optimizing? Because of the investor equivalence principle. Why m(x)? Because, so far, this is all that we have given him -the prices {p i } of the securities {s i }. We emphasize that this is just a starting point of a calculation.
"Unacceptable!" -some people may say. "Indeed!" -agrees the investor and demands immediate access to the rest of his data. He discovers related markets, analyzes historical records. At this point he may notice differences in drifts implied by his research and m(x).
In some such cases, he may want to speak in terms of "real" and "risk-neutral" worlds to articulate his findings. Eventually he stops researching the markets and writes down his believed distribution b(x).
1 Learning process and investment structuring
Growth-optimizing
General investor
A true growth-optimizing investor would normally stop here and proceed directly to the construction of the payoff via equation (3), as shown on Figure 1 . In general, however, the investor might have to process additional information about his personal preferences. The investor needs to incorporate this information into the calculation given, of course, what he already included about the market. The investor equivalence principle tells us how we can describe this additional learning step mathematically.
Indeed, according to the investor equivalence principle, we can continue to view our investor as growth-optimizing as long as we can imagine persuading him to believe β(x).
It is important to emphasize that we do not simply imagine someone who already believes β(x). We demand logical continuity: we started with a growth-optimizing investor, he has already learned about the market, and now we want him to learn additional information which would make him behave as if he had a different system of preferences. In other words, we want to see if our investor can take his belief b(x) and update it once again using Bayes' theorem arriving at β(x). Equation (9) describes exactly this additional learning step and Figure 1 summarizes the whole process including the derivation of the final optimal payoff F .
The above discussion leads us to two important observations. First, although not entirely obvious from its structure, Eq. (9) is about incorporating information on risk aversion into product design. In subsequent sections we further distill this idea and demonstrate its power on practical applications. Second, we see that incorporating all information that is relevant to investments (objective or personal) is clearly an important ability for an investor. Those investors which can do that without contradicting the logic of Bayes' theorem are especially important, so we give them a name. Let us call them logical investors. In the Appendix B we provide additional context both to justify this name and to give a better feel for the role such investors play in our theory.
Payoff elasticity equation
Dividing both sides of Eq. (9) by m(x) and using equations (3) and (2) we derive
This is an integral equation for F (x). We want to convert it into a more practical differential form.
The concept of elasticity gives us a particular way of differentiating that proved to be especially useful in economics and finance. Elasticity of a function, φ(x), with respect to its argument, x, is defined as the derivative
This measures the percentage change in the function's value with respect to percentage change in its argument.
Classical notion of utility does not depend on x explicitly [6] . In our notation this is the case when the second argument of u happens to be redundant: u(ln F, x) = u(ln F ). We investigate this case first and then discuss what happens in general. Taking the logarithm on both sides of Eq. (10), forgetting temporarily about the explicit dependence of u on x and differentiating we obtain
Note that x is the only variable quantity. The denominator on the rhs of Eq. (10) does not depend on x and drops out from the above differential equation. Rearranging the terms,
Thinking about practical applications, removing the explicit use of the highly theoretical concept of utility function from the above equation is our next challenge.
It is well known that affine transformations of the utility function do not have any effect on investors' preferences. Utility functions effectively ignore the two most fundamental mathematical operations -addition and multiplication by a number. This fact limits practical use of utility functions, especially when we want to talk about risk aversion.
To remedy the situation, a variety of measures for risk aversion were introduced. The most popular of them are probably the Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute and relative risk aversion:
where U is the standard definition of utility which is connected to our slightly more general notion, u, via the equation U(F (x)) = u(ln F (x)). By direct calculation we have
Using the definition of relative risk aversion (14), we can now rewrite Eq. (13) as
This simple equation is the central technical result of this paper. It gives us a fundamental link between payoff elasticity and risk aversion. The more risk aversion we have the less elastic is the payoff.
On the practical side, this equation allows us to compute the optimal payoff F from the growth-optimal f and the risk aversion profile R of the client. Conversely, we are now also able to compute risk aversion profiles directly from clients' positions.
For completeness, we mention some alternative forms of Eq. (16) which can be used depending on the application. Considering the payoff elasticity equation (16) for two different general investors we derive
This equation shows that other payoff profiles (not necessarily growth-optimal) can serve us as building blocks. The concept of elasticity can be replaced by the ordinary differentiation if we decide to work in terms of a less fundamental measure of absolute risk aversion:
A (1) .
How would the above derivation change if we allowed for explicit dependence of u on x?
The payoff elasticity equation would stay the same but the expressions for both R and A would become more complicated. In particular, they would acquire explicit dependence on the state x (see Appendix A), but would of course reduce to the original Arrow-Pratt definitions in the special case of state-independent preferences. On the practical level, the important thing to mention is that essentially all of these equations have been solved and present no further technical challenge. Indeed, Picard-Lindelöf theorem provides the necessary theory (for the one-dimensional case) and even offers an explicit construction of the general solution (Picard iteration method).
Illustrations
In this section we illustrate practical usage of the payoff elasticity equation. We warm up on a simple analytically solvable example and show how to examine structuring ideas that do not necessarily come from our theory. We then turn to the main power of the payoff elasticity equation -the ability to understand and to adjust clients' risk aversion. We show that naive attempts to express risk aversion can be dangerous and that payoff elasticity equation provides us with a more sound technology.
One-parameter investor families
By a one-parameter family we mean a set of investors whose degree of risk aversion is controlled by a single number, e.g. constant absolute or constant relative risk aversion.
The usefulness of one-parameter families comes from the fact that the position of an investor within the family can be determined by asking the investor a single question regarding, for instance, their maximum acceptable loss. To illustrate this point, let us look at Eq. (18) and consider the case when it takes a particularly simple form: we set
where a is a constant which controls the strength of risk aversion. We immediately derive
We see that a effectively scales the payoff around the bond line F = 1. This is exactly how Figure 2 in [4] was constructed. The value of a can be easily found by matching investors maximum acceptable loss.
Product validation
Can our theory accommodate every imaginable investor? Of course not. One can imagine investors that demand greater flexibility than our equations would allow. As explained in Appendix B, we should be very cautious in offering assistance to such investors as not every desire is necessarily wise. At the moment it may be more prudent to focus on the many unexplored possibilities that are already offered by our theory.
Having said that, it is very important to acknowledge that investment ideas are born in all sorts of ways and good ideas may not necessarily come through an explicit use of our theory. To recognize such cases we want the ability to verify that a given investment strategy is both rational and logical.
In order to see how this can be done, let us examine the family of investors considered in [8] . The investors are looking for a payoff structure, h(x), which solves a certain optimization problem. Using our notation, the optimization problem reads:
where R a is a parameter that controls the degree of risk aversion. In Ref. [8] this problem was introduced by analogy with the mean-variance optimization approach of Markowitz.
It is important to note, however, that the mean and the variance, given by the first and the second term of (21) respectively, are computed using two very different distributions.
In particular, the mean is computed using the investor-believed b(x), while the definition of variance is using the market-implied m(x). As a result, the optimization setup (21-22) does not fit well into utility maximization paradigm, so, on its own, the setup (21-22) is not enough to recommend the investment as rational. The idea of penalizing market-based variance does, however, make significant intuitive sense, so let us not rush into dismissing it on formal grounds. Let us independently investigate in what sense the above idea may point towards a sensible product.
In what follows we put aside any attempts to justify the optimization (21-22) and proceed by directly examining its solution, h(x). By doing so we put ourselves in a rather typical situation when an investment product is proposed which looks good yet with some questions regarding its real quality. Before we can recommend the product, we want to verify the assumptions under which h(x) may be viewed as a rational strategy pursued by a logical investor. The expression for h(x) is given by the first equation in [8] , namely
By rearranging the terms we can rewrite this equation as
This allows us to understand the investment through the eyes of a growth-optimizing investor. Indeed, using equation (3) we derive
where f (x) is the growth-optimal payoff structure. Finally, we see that
We immediately recognize this equation as a particular case of the one-parameter investor family which we considered above. Indeed, the only difference between this equation and equation (20) is the absence of an additive constant -the upfront investment cost of 1 -which drops out from (26) on the account of the constraint (22). This constraint assumes the existence of a perfectly liquid two-way market in options on x which effectively allows the investor to borrow from the market and set up the investment at zero upfront cost. Such assumptions are very important to note and check. Other than that we managed to verify that the solution of the optimization (21-22) can be viewed as a rational investment pursued by a logical investor with understandable risk aversion strategy.
Implying and adjusting risk aversion
Empirical computations of risk aversion have always been a very challenging task. Not so much anymore. We can now imply risk aversion directly from clients' positions or ideas, adjust it if necessary and use it to structure the optimal product.
To emphasize the immediate relevance of our techniques in the context of current practices, let us review one of the most popular ideas in finance -expressing higher risk aversion by implementing a more conservative view. This very simple idea is not confined to finance. It almost certainly came into our field from other more basic human behaviors. It obviously has powerful evolutionary reasons yet it is not without faults. Failing strategies, later described as "half-measures" or "indecisions", often begin their life as a conservative interpretations of data. So let us examine how robust this idea really is in the mathematical context of financial structuring. Imagine a growth-optimizing investor which believes that the skew should be half of the value observed on the market. This view and the corresponding optimal payout are depicted in red on Figures 2.A and 2 .B. The investor decides to be more cautious and to avoid expressing his view in the wings. To this end he manually adjusts his original view by gently forcing it to revert back to the market in the wings (blue line on Figure 2 .A). The corresponding payoff structure is given by the blue line on Figure 2 .B.
We can now use the payoff elasticity equation and examine the risk aversion profile which corresponds to investor's attempt to soften his view. Before we do that, let us think what we expect to see. Risk aversion profile for a growth-optimizing investor is flat R = 1. So, surely, what we should see is a profile that lies above the line R = 1 increasing further in the wings.
Looking at Figure 2 .C we see that this intuition could not be further from the truth. Not only the profile does not form a convex line above growth-optimizing, it widely oscillates crossing R = 1 and even goes negative. Was the investor too crude in modifying his view? Was he too harsh or too lenient? Either way, how could he become less risk averse and even crossed the line into risk-loving territory of gambling? We encourage the reader to try their own ways of modifying views. The more you try the more evidence you obtain supporting the inevitable conclusion -it is very difficult, practically impossible, to achieve consistent sensible risk aversion by ad-hoc modification of views.
Using payoff elasticity equation gives us a much easier way of including risk aversion. To demonstrate that let us create a simple textbook example. We take the same market and the same growth-optimizing investor as we considered above. This time, however, we accommodate investor's desire to suppress his view in the wings by stating a very high level of risk aversion -see Figure 2 .D. Integrating the payoff elasticity equation immediately gives us the payoff structure - Figure 2 .E.
The two Figures 2.D and 2.E also illustrate the corrective effect of adjusting risk aversion profiles. By comparison to growth-optimizing, the investor with the risk aversion R is more risk-averse in the wings (R > 1) and less risk-averse near ATM (R < 1). Looking at the payoff (blue line F on Figure 2 .E) we see that the investor effectively reallocates his exposure from the wings to the ATM region. This reallocation effect can be perfectly removed (if desired) by replacing R withR, i.e. by making sure that we are at least as risk averse as the growth-optimizing investor. Having obtained the payoffs we can easily illustrate them in terms of market views. This would give us pictures which resemble Figure 2 .A in the general shape with the difference that this time we don't just hope (and almost surely fail) to imply some reasonable risk aversion -this time we know exactly what we are building (this is how Investor 2 on Figure 2 .A in Ref [1] was constructed).
Direct modifications of payoffs is yet another example of popular structuring ad-hocery for imitating risk aversion. The most benign examples of that are introducing ad-hoc floors and caps on top of otherwise problematic payoffs. To see that direct payoff modifications can be dangerous, all we have to do is to examine modifications of f presented on Figures 2.B and 2.E. At first glance all of them look reasonable.
As the above examples illustrate, modifying payoff structures by changing risk aversion profiles is easy and intuitive. With almost no practice you will see how to produce structures that appear to have caps, floors and other recognizable features that can be very useful in describing the resulting product. As before, we don't just hope to produce sensible risk aversion as a byproduct of ad-hoc modifications -we know exactly what risk aversion profile we are using.
Rules of thumb
Handling risk aversion is a complicated and delicate enough task to require a specialist tool. Payoff elasticity equation gives us such a tool. It would be even better, however, if we could say something practical about products even when knowing next to nothing about risk preferences. Amazingly enough, this is possible.
Note, for instance, that most investors would want to express positive risk aversion.
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We immediately see that positive risk aversion implies that F and f must agree on the location and the type of their extremum points. Indeed, as we vary x both F (x) and f (x) should be going up or down together for the elasticity d ln F/d ln f to remain positive. Violation of this simple rule is what produced the wildly oscillating often negative profile of Figure 2 .C.
We can talk about state-agnostic and state-dependent investors. For the former kind the utility of their investment depends only on its performance -the classical Arrow-Pratt investor. The latter kind also cares about the underlying market at maturity. Clients would normally know which kind they are and we can easily test if they get the right kind of product. Indeed, for a state-agnostic investor (imagine a US investor who is exposed to UK market only via his investment), R depends on x only via F . In this case, by the payoff elasticity equation, F becomes a function of f . This we can test by simply plotting F against f (while varying x as a parameter) and then examining the picture. Figure 3. F, for instance, shows thatF cannot be computed from f alone -a typical signature of a state-dependent investment.
We learned that the locations of the maxima and minima of F are essentially determined by that of f . Given that F is just a function, the locations and the types of its extremal points already give us a lot of information. A lot more can be said about F which belongs to a state-agnostic investor. The fact that F depends on x only via f imposes severe constrains. We can see, for example, that F and f intersect on a bond line, i.e. if
, where c is a constant (not necessarily 1).
Because structuring is often constrained by practical considerations (such as the number of traded strikes which we could use for replicating the final product) such rules of thumb provide us with a lot of information. Couple that with additional data like maximum tolerable loss and you might be able to sketch the final optimal structure without detailed knowledge of your client's risk aversion.
Summary
3 Structuring as a manufacturing process At the heart of structuring we always have optimization which reflects the goals of the client. This is preceded by preparatory steps defining the problem and followed by packaging of the solution into a tradeable product. Together these steps form the backbone of a manufacturing process which we summarized on Figure 3 .
The preparatory steps include deciding on the market variable, capturing the relevant market and client views and identifying the goals of the client. This leads us to the key solution stage where our equations come in: the growth-optimal b = f m and the payoff elasticity equation. After the solution stage we check the quality of the derived product and we may decide to go back and redefine the underlying variable. In [1] we considered a detailed example when this happens. Having satisfied ourselves with the solution we proceed to the final stage of packaging it into a tradeable product.
Appendix A: Discrete elasticity equation
In the derivation of the payoff elasticity equation we made two assumptions: first, we considered continuous x and, second, we considered state-independent utility functions, i.e. utilities which depend on x only via the value of the payoff F (x). We did it simply to illuminate the connection with the classic Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion which were built on these assumptions. In the actual fact, none of these assumptions is important to us except, of course, that the continuous case benefits from the rich toolbox of calculus.
A few lines of algebra give us a discrete fully general payoff elasticity equation. Indeed, dividing both sides of Eq. (8) by m k and using Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) we obtain
We then compute
Taking logarithm on both sides and rearranging terms,
Finally we get a discrete payoff elasticity equation
where the expression for R k,k+1 in terms of utility can be easily obtained from the previous equation. We see that, in contrast to the original Arrow-Pratt notion, R k,k+1 depends not only on F but also on x. Detailed investigations of state-dependent utilities and the emergence of R k,k+1 as a generalization of the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion is a very interesting topic. This, however, would take us far outside the scope of this paper.
